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ichigan law protects the interests of legal fathers in their
presumed offspring in the face of a challenge by a man as-
serting biological fatherhood. I For this reason, in Girard v
Wagenmaker, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a man wish-
ing to assert biological paternity of a child born while the mother
was married to another man is precluded from doing so unless a
court order finding that the child was born out of wedlock is first
obtained. Until recently, when handling child protective proceed-
ings, Michigan courts applied a different rule that focused on the
child's biological rather than legal father.
In re Montgomery2 involved a request to terminate parental
rights. In that case, at the time of the child's birth, the mother was
married to a man who was not the child's biological father. The
court held that the legal father lacked standing to contest termina-
tion of his parental rights because he was not the biological father.
Thus, paternity issues in child protective proceedings were handled
as an exception to the general rule protecting the rights of legal
rather than biological fathers. In 2004, the Michigan Supreme
Court decided In re KH,3 which eliminated this exception and es-
tablished a single doctrine applicable when paternity is at issue.
In practice, it seems, KH is not widely understood. Child pro-
tection petitions for temporary custody continue to name multiple
men as the "father" of a child when there is a legal father. Some
courts insist on terminating the parental rights of "John Doe" when
no man has established paternity. After K, are such actions neces-
sary? Are they permissible?
Background
In KH, Child Protective Services (CPS) filed a petition request-
ing that the parental rights of Tina and Richard Jefferson to four
children be terminated. The Jeffersons were married at all relevant
times; thus, the children had a "legal father." CPS, however, named
three additional "putative fathers": Larry Lagrone, Fredrick Herron,
and "John Doe."
During the proceedings before a family court referee, Mrs. Jef-
ferson testified that Herron was the biological father of one of the
children, Lagrone the biological father of the other three, and Mr.
Jefferson the biological father of none of the children. The referee
indicated that because the children had a legal father, there was no
reason for either biological father to participate in the proceeding.
Subsequent DNA testing established Lagrone as the biological
father of three of the children. Mr. Jefferson indicated that he was
not the father of the children and did not wish to participate in the
proceedings. The referee, relying on the DNA tests, found that La-
grone was the biological father of the three children. As a result,
Lagrone sought a determination from the court that Mr. Jefferson
was not the "father" of the three children as defined in the court
rules.4 Lagrone's counsel argued that the family court had the au-
thority to make a finding of paternity. Mrs. Jefferson objected, argu-
ing that Lagrone lacked standing. The family court ruled that La-
grone did have standing to raise the issue and granted his motion. It
did so in reliance on Montgomery. In essence, the family court made
a finding of "paternity" with respect to the putative father, nullify-
ing the status of the legal father. The judge stated that she was
"troubled" by the effect of this ruling because the putative father
would have standing to request a paternity determination in the
child protective proceeding although he lacked standing under the
Paternity Act. The judge also noted the absence of statutory author-
ity permitting such a result, but indicated that this result was man-
dated by court rule and Montgomery.
The lawyer-guardian ad litem sought an appeal. After it decided
In re CAW, 5 the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in KH re-
garding the following issues:
" Does a putative father have standing in a child protective pro-
ceeding to request a paternity determination when the chil-
dren involved already have a legal father?
* In this case, what is the legal significance of the family court's
finding that the putative father is the biological father of three
of the children?
" Do the juvenile court rules provide greater standing to a puta-
tive father than is provided by the Paternity Act?
" Given that MCR 3.921(C)(2)(b), formerly MCR 5.921, au-
thorizes a family court judge to determine that a putative father
is the child's "natural" father, does the rule authorize that judge
to determine that the putative father is the legal father, or must
a putative father file a complaint under the Paternity Act?
" Does CAW apply to this case?
The Supreme Court's Ruling
The KH Court began its analysis by noting that the juvenile
code does not address the question of paternity.6 The Court then
considered the applicable court rules. It noted that the court rules
define "father" in such a way that a putative father may be named
only if the child lacks a legal father. If the child has a legal father, a
putative father cannot "be identified as a respondent or otherwise
given notice."7
The Court then analyzed the Paternity Act. It first observed that
Lagrone had attempted to establish paternity within the child pro-
tective proceeding "rather than through the legislatively provided
mechanism designed to govern the establishment of paternity
claims-the Paternity Act."8 Relying on Girard v Wagenmaker,9 the
Court found that Lagrone would have lacked standing under the
Paternity Act. The Court went on to "conclude, consistently with
the language of the Paternity Act, that a determination that a child
is born out of wedlock must be made by the court before a biologi-
cal father may be identified in a child protective proceeding."10 In
Barnes v Jeudevine,Ii the Michigan Supreme Court recently reaf-
firmed the need for a specific judicial finding supported by clear
and convincing evidence that a child conceived during a marriage
was not the issue of that marriage, concluding that entry of a default
judgment stating that "no children were born of this marriage and
none are expected" is insufficient. A finding that a child was born
out of wedlock may be made in a child protective proceeding,12 but
it does not confer standing on the putative father3 because "[n]oth-
ing in the.., court rules permits a paternity determination to be
made in the midst of a child protective proceeding."1 4 Rather, a
finding in a child protective proceeding that a child is born out of
wedlock merely serves as the prior finding required under the Pater-
nity Act 15 or the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act 16 to provide an
alleged biological father standing to seek to establish paternity.
Resolution
The Court noted that "where a legal father exists, a biological
father cannot properly be considered even a putative father,"17 and
held that Lagrone lacked standing to participate in the proceed-
ings. The family court's finding that the mother said her husband
was not the biological father, the fact that the children's legal father
did not wish to be considered a party or to assert his rights, and
the family court's finding that Lagrone was the biological father
laid the groundwork for the finding that the children were born
out of wedlock. The Court remanded the case to permit the family
court to make this finding. Lagrone could then pursue his pater-
nity claim separately.
Because Montgomery was overruled, i8 paternity determinations
are now handled uniformly across all family law applications.
Practice Implications
Understanding and properly applying In re KH-and In re
CAW-is critically important. When paternity is an issue, the court
should first determine whether there is a legal father. The juvenile
court rules define "father" to include "[a] man judicially deter-
mined to have parental rights."19 A legal father who is not a biologi-
cal father may retain parental rights even over the mother's objec-
tion if he is an "equitable parent."20 A legal father is an equitable
parent if (1) the father and the child mutually acknowledged their
relationship as father and child and the wife cooperated in fostering
that relationship over a period of time, (2) the husband desires to
have the rights of a father, and (3) the husband is willing to accept
support obligations. In such a case, the court should find that the
child has a "father" as defined by MCR 3.903(A)(7).
Who has standing to challenge paternity? It is clear that either
the mother or the legal father may challenge the husband's parental
status. It is also clear that a biological father lacks standing to chal-
lenge paternity in the child protective proceeding despite his biologi-
cal relationship if there is a legal father. A biological father does not
have a due process right to challenge the paternity of a child who has
a legal father.21 It is unclear whether the child has standing to chal-
lenge paternity if there is a legal father. In Michael H v Gerald D,22
the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process clause does not guarantee a child the right to do
so. That case, however, involved a child custody proceeding. Unlike
divorce or child custody proceedings, the child is a party to a child.
protective proceeding,23 which may confer standing to raise the
issue of paternity, although the question has not been squarely ad-
dressed by any Michigan appellate court.
If a party with standing contests the legal father's paternity, the
court should hold a hearing pursuant to MCR 3.921(C). If the
court finds that the child was born out of wedlock, it should make
a finding that the child does not have a "father" as defined in MCR
3.903(A) (7). In such a case, the legal father is excused from the pro-
ceeding, and the court may hold a hearing to determine the identity
of the child's biological father. The court may need to provide no-
tice to a putative father.24 If the court determines that an identifi-
able individual is the child's father, the court may order that he es-
tablish paternity.25 If the putative father fails to appear after notice,
or if he is ordered to establish paternity but fails to do so, the court
should find that he has waived his right to further notice of the
proceedings, including notice of a supplemental termination peti-
tion.26 Finally, if no putative father can be identified after "diligent
inquiry," the court should so find.27
Should the court permit the legal father to simply release his
rights? In In re CAW28 the Supreme Court held that a decision to
terminate the parental rights of a child's legal father does not consti-
tute a prior finding that the child was born out of wedlock and does
not provide standing to the alleged biological father to enter the case.
The logic of KH and CAW suggests that if the legal father of the
child is permitted to release his parental rights, that release will not
constitute the prior finding that would give the biological father
standing to establish paternity. He cannot participate in the proceed-
ing. Accordingly, when paternity is contested, the court should not
allow the legal, nonbiological father to release his parental rights.
Terminating Putative Fathers' Rights
Despite the holding in KH, some courts and petitioners include
the names of putative fathers when there is a legal father or name
"John Doe" on termination petitions when the child has no legal
father. These courts terminate the rights of individuals who have no
rights to terminate. As a general rule, KH makes clear that it is no
longer necessary to terminate the rights of a0putative father or of a
"John Doe" and, in fact, chastised the practice of naming "serial
men" in termination petitions when there is a legal father. If the
putative father of a child with no legal father has been properly no-
ticed and has not established paternity, or if the identity of the
child's father is unknown, the court should make a finding pur-
suant to MCR 3.921(C) that the child has no legal father as de-
fined by MCR 3.903(A)(7). This general rule is also clearly spelled
out in the court rule concerning termination of parental rights.
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By allowing a proper party to rebut the presumption that a child
born during a marriage is the issue of that marriage, Michigan law
focuses on terminating the parental rights of only legally established
fathers. "If the legal relationship is not established, a biological father
41
may not be named as a respondent on a termination petition, the
genetic relationship notwithstanding."30 If no man has legally estab-
lished paternity, it is not necessary to terminate the parental rights
of a straw man to ensure that the child is freed for adoption.
There may be one exception to the general rule excluding puta-
tive fathers. In Stanley v Illinois,31 although the children's parents had
never married, they lived together for some 18 years. Stanley lived
with and supported his children. When the children's mother died,
the state, acting in accordance with a state law that presumed that an
unwed father was unfit, removed the children from Stanley's cus-
tody. Although not legally established as their father, because Stanley
had a substantial relationship with his children, the Court held that
he was entitled to due process before the state could remove them.
Thus, if a father, although merely putative, has a substantial relation-
ship with and has supported his child, he is entided to a hearing on
his fitness before the state may terminate his parental rights. Failure
to name such a father in the petition may be reversible error.
Conclusion
Careful study of In re KH makes clear that it is no longer per-
missible to name putative fathers when there is a legal father. The
practice of terminating the rights of putative fathers or naming men
who have not established paternity is generally unnecessary *
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